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Abstract
Applications of Foucault’s work in psychology have been criticised for using an under-theorised notion of discourse. This has recently been addressed by Hook, who provides a timely and detailed consideration of the implications of Foucault’s theoretical and methodological writings on genealogy. Hook’s work also hints at but leaves unaddressed the challenge for critical psychology of accounting for Foucault’s concerns with the constitution and experience of forms of subjectivity. In relation to this challenge, we contend that Foucault’s work can productively be understood as a series of analyses comprising a tripartite critical ontology with significant concerns for subjectivity and individual conduct. We set out this reading and briefly explore Foucault’s intellectual debt to Heidegger. We argue that this suggests the possibility of a form of discourse analysis conceptualised along similar lines to Foucault’s “critical ontology of ourselves.” This is illustrated with some examples from recent research.
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Towards a “Critical Ontology of Ourselves”?
Foucault, Subjectivity and Discourse Analysis
In recent papers, Hook (2001a, 2001b, 2005a) provides a timely correction to the charge that conceptions of “discourse” in “Foucauldian” discourse analysis generally bear little resemblance to that used by Foucault, and that discourse is under-theorised in this area of psychology (e.g., Fox, 1998). Hook provides a thorough reading of Foucault’s writings on discourse and genealogy. He argues that Foucault’s methodological injunctions and conception of discourse can be better accommodated within critical genealogies than discourse analysis (Hook, 2001a), and are incommensurable with any “psychology [that] would push the notions of human consciousness [and] subjectivity… to the forefront of its attempts to know the social world” (Hook, 2005a, p. 28).
Genealogies are potentially important for critical psychology—as Rose’s work (e.g., 1996) demonstrates. However, Willig (2005) wonders whether studies of subjectivity are necessarily incompatible with a Foucauldian orientation, and suggests that much may be gained from such studies without reinstating problematic constructions of the subject that Foucault attacked. Hook (2005b) agrees that there is no reason that subjectivity—sufficiently historicised—should not be taken as an object of study. He hints at a balance to be struck in theorising subjectivity without tipping over into resituating the singular subject as centre of meaning and interpretation.
It would ill-behove anyone who takes these arguments seriously to reproduce the notion of the transcendent, ahistorical subject which was anathema to Foucault (as it was to Heidegger—a point we shall return to). There is thus a challenge to be faced in making subjectivity amenable to study in discourse analysis.
We see this as a challenge worth undertaking. Whilst some readings of Foucault see him as dismissing the notion of subjectivity (and even human agency) completely, we argue that questions of subjectivity and agency form a potentially important area of study for critical psychology, and are also important in Foucault’s work. As Dreyfus (2004) points out, the absence of any notion of the agentive subject in Foucault’s earlier works, and his reduction of subjectivity to a function of discourse was something he later came to regret and moved to correct (see also Foucault, 1993, 1984/1997a, etc.).
We explore in this paper the potential for applying Foucauldian notions of truth, power, subjectivity, and ethics to discourse analysis. This task involves a different approach than the historical analyses outlined in Foucault’s methodologically-oriented papers. It approaches Foucault’s works not as a methodologically-prescriptive oeuvre, but as an adaptable set of tools or “gadgets” (Foucault, 1980, 1989).
We present a reading of “Foucault,” for whom problems of freedom, agency, and subjectivity are centrally important, and contend that these notions are useful in understanding subjectivity, focusing critique, and analysing discourse. An important set of issues for understanding these points concerns the relationship of Foucault’s work to that of Heidegger, who he considered “the essential philosopher” (Foucault, 1984/1988). We briefly discuss this relationship and hope further to explore it in future papers.
This paper is not a response to, nor criticism of, Hook’s work. We present here the continuation of lines of thought begun elsewhere (e.g., Yates, 2002; Yates, Dyson, & Hiles, 2008), and Hook has been invaluable in encouraging us to interrogate some of our assumptions. We hope this paper might be seen, in a Foucauldian spirit, as further opening a position which aims to explore the insights of Foucault’s work and make them function in new ways for critical psychology.
We first present an overview of the development of Foucault’s work contextualised by his conception of a division between the “philosophy of experience” and the “philosophy of concept” (e.g., Foucault, 1989), and briefly examine the relationship of his work to Heidegger’s. We then draw upon Foucault’s later conceptualisation of his work as a “critical ontology of ourselves” (Foucault, 1984/1997b) comprising three domains—truth, power and ethics—and explore some possibilities this might offer for discourse analysis.
The Philosophy of Concept Versus the Philosophy of Experience
Despite the difficulties with analysing Foucault’s corpus as a coherent oeuvre, he did provide some indications of a general critical outlook that had driven his analyses (e.g., Foucault, 1989, 1984/1997a). He characterised his work as a series of inquiries constituting the “history of the present” (Foucault, 1977), asking “what is happening around us, what is our present?” (Foucault, 1989, p. 407). This invoked a critical historical orientation towards the “games of truth” (Foucault, 1984/1997a) to which we relate as subjects, constitute ourselves and our systems of knowledge, and formulate problems for our thought. For example, examining how and why madness became an important problem for the modern world (Foucault, 1989).
Foucault had important things to say about the starting point of these inquiries. He differentiated his work from a tradition he called “the philosophy of the subject” (1989, 1993) or “the philosophy of experience” (1989, 1984/1997a). This type of philosophy, which Foucault saw as one response to the reception of Husserl in France, starts with a theory of the subject (such as that found in the existentialism of Sartre) as the originating creator of meaning and, on the basis of this asks “how a given form of knowledge [is] possible” (Foucault, 1984/1997a, p. 290).
In opposition to this, Foucault stated that he began by trying “to get out from the philosophy of the subject,” being more interested in “the constitution of the subject across history which has led us up to the modern conception of the self” (1993, p. 202). Approaches grounded in the “philosophy of experience” could not account for the structuring effects of signifying practices that would make such a study possible (Foucault, 1989, 1993). Foucault aligned his project instead with another tradition, which he called “the philosophy of concept” (e.g., 1989). This type of thought was significant in French history and philosophy of science, particularly Canguilhem’s (1968/1989) critical histories of concepts such as “normal” and “pathological” in biology and medicine.
In Foucault’s early “archaeological” studies this tradition (and Canguilhem’s influence) is clear. “Archaeology” is an historical method for analysing systems of knowledge. It is opposed to traditional histories, which seek to identify “the progress of consciousness, the teleology of reason, or the evolution of human thought” (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 8). Discontinuities and ruptures rather than progress and evolution become key concepts. The purpose (simply put) is to search for the processes by which systems of knowledge are demarcated, and the ways in which disciplines, objects, concepts, and enunciations which can be made in relation to them undergo transformations and appear and disappear from the discursive field at particular times.
Objects of knowledge are not conceived exterior to discourse. Instead, archaeology examines how objects emerge and are organised, selected, transformed, and put into demarcated fields in discourse. For archaeology discourse is not “a mere intersection of things and words” (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 45). Rather, discourses “systematically form the objects of which they speak” (p. 49).
In The Order of Things, Foucault (1966/1970) undertook an archaeology of the manner in which the human sciences have taken the human being as their object of knowledge. Here Foucault (1966/1970) argues that “man [sic] is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge” (p. 386). “Man,” and the knowledge that we have of “him,” belong to a production which emerged with the human sciences which took “him” as their object. Our conception of “man” is not “natural” or inevitable, but is linked to a particular ordering of knowledge.
The existence of human subjects as possible objects of knowledge is thus not taken for granted as the a priori basis of a possible science. Rather, the process by which they are constituted as such is recognised as a contingent and historically-situated production of knowledge which can be exposed by use of the “archaeological” method. The phenomenological subject of the “philosophy of experience” is comprehensively eradicated.
After the publication of The Archaeology of Knowledge came a 6 year gap before Foucault’s next book. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) suggest that during this time, Foucault was struggling with the implications of his earlier ideas. In particular, the issue that analysis of the rules governing systems of discursive formations is, for archaeology, an end in itself and leaves no room for social concerns or understanding the role of social institutions. Because discursive practices are seen as “autonomous” and determining their own context, “Foucault cannot look for the regulative power which seems to govern the discursive practices outside of the practices themselves… the result is the strange notion of regularities which regulate themselves” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 84).
Foucault looked back on this period and commented that he could no longer speak from the disinterested space he earlier claimed. He asked himself “what else it was that I was talking about…but power,” (Foucault, 1980, p. 115) and stated that, lacking the tools for an appropriate analysis of power, he had confused his earlier problems and inappropriately focused on “systematicity, theoretical form, or something like a paradigm” (p. 113) where other forms of analysis were needed.
He came to recognise that his earlier archaeological works were insufficient in themselves. He would longer play the role of detached archaeologist piecing together the structures of rules governing the formation of statements in systems of knowledge, but would connect his analyses to social concerns and power.
Foucault termed his new approach “genealogy”: a “meticulous and patiently documentary” analysis (Foucault, 1971/1987a), which introduced a central concern for practices and institutions to the historical study of discourse. We will not expand upon the methodological assumptions and imperatives of this approach, as they have been quite thoroughly covered by Hook (2005a).
Foucault, initially at least, still sought to preserve a place for archaeology, arguing that archaeology could provide an “analysis of local discursivities” (1980, p. 85) alongside genealogy, which traces the emergence, formation, and rejection of systems of knowledge, and their links to social practices and institutions. A key aspect of genealogy is the interrogation of the ways in which systems of knowledge that take human beings as their object are linked to forms of social apparatus (dispositifs), comprising a “heterogeneous ensemble…of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 194).
This illustrates Foucault’s emerging notion that systems of knowledge are inherently connected with power. This “power-knowledge” nexus constitutes what is attended to, what is desirable to be done, how people and objects are to be understood, related to, and acted upon. Thus, for example, the knowledge that is gathered of human behaviour can be understood in terms of a norm or an ideal of desirability. This makes possible power relations which centre on monitoring and assessing a population, and identifying, disciplining, and correcting deviant individuals within it. Similarly, a power whose aim is to normalise or discipline produces and utilises systems of knowledge which are useful in attaining this objective. There is a constant, reciprocal articulation “of power on knowledge and of knowledge on power” (Foucault, 1989, p. 51).
Power produces more than knowledge and systems of social apparatus, however. It also “produces the very form of the subject” (Foucault, 1989, p. 158). The individual is not a pre-given phenomenological subject, an “elementary nucleus” (Foucault, 1980) onto which power fastens, nor some form of original sovereign will standing opposite its antithesis of a power that constrains and limits it (Foucault, 1984/1988). It is, instead “one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98).
The individual subject does not stand face-to-face with power; it is already one of its effects in terms of the identities to which it is tied and by which it understands itself, the positions from which it acts with respect to itself and others (Foucault, 1982). Power “brings into play relations between individuals...[it] designates relationships” (p. 217).
Foucault’s strong emphasis on this dissolution of the sovereign, ahistorical phenomenological subject is what gives rise to readings of his work as denying wholesale the existence of subjectivity (and even, in a wider sense, human agency) (McWhorter, 2003). However, as McWhorter (2003) points out, Foucault’s conception of subjectivity is more sophisticated than this, embodying a rejection only of an ahistorical subjectivity alongside a deeper concern for the constitution of forms of subjectivity as actually experienced. This more nuanced reading is perhaps supported by the importance that Foucault later attributed to Heidegger as an influence on his philosophical development. Heidegger, after all, began his philosophical inquiry through a phenomenological understanding of the human being as “dasein”; as a being experiencing and actively engaged in the world and oriented towards an understanding of its own being, with the possibility of “authenticity” (eigentlichkeit) conceived as taking responsibility for choosing its own way of being:
In each case dasein is mine to be one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine… In each case dasein is its possibility… Because dasein is in each case its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, “choose itself.” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 68)
What Heidegger is discussing here seems antithetical to what we have discussed of Foucault’s work. Nevertheless, Foucault (1984/1988), towards the end of his life, reflected that “Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher… my whole philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger” (p. 470).
A deeper understanding of this apparent contradiction is material to the reading and application of “Foucault” that we propose.
Foucault, Heidegger, Agency, Freedom, and Subjectivity
One point to clarify is that Heidegger does not simply reinstate the self-sufficient Cartesian subject. On the contrary, he explicitly rejects both the primacy of this subject and the language which expresses it: “the idea of a subject which has intentional experiences... encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are” (as cited in Dreyfus, 2004).
Heidegger’s substitution of references to the subjective sphere with the term “dasein” is a reflection of his aim to move beyond Cartesian thinking (Dreyfus, 2004). Rather than being a self-sufficient, autonomous source of meaning, dasein is “always already” “thrown” into a way of being shaped not by itself but by the world it inhabits. “Cultural practices” unavoidably shape dasein’s being, and bound its agency (Dreyfus, 2004). As Heidegger (1962) puts it, it is from the kind of being shaped by these practices that ‘Dasein draws its pre-ontological way of interpreting its Being… Ontological interpretation follows the tendency to interpret in this way: it understands Dasein in terms of the world” (p. 168).
However, whilst disturbing the concept of the autonomous, self-thematising subject, Heidegger’s thinking contains a central awareness of dasein’s agency and experience and its potential for choosing ways of being. As Dreyfus (2004) points out, such a conception had no parallel in the early work of Foucault, but this was something he later came to regret and correct.
This is one indication of the potential importance that an awareness of Heidegger’s work has for our understandings of concepts of agency and experience. We believe that Heidegger’s work has wider potential relevance to psychology, and that there remain further parallels to explore between his work and Foucault’s. For instance, Charlesworth (2000) draws on Heidegger to examine forms of experience, comportment, and understandings of social space in the lives of working class people in northern England. He deals with different issues to those raised here—such as coping, anxiety, and mood. However, his work is significant in wrestling with the problem of how to analyse and understand phenomena that, although shaping the intelligibility of people’s lives, are not formalised or objectified by them and are understood and expressed by them in incomplete and contradictory ways. This approach (and other potential applications of Heidegger) certainly merits further examination for critical forms of psychology concerned with experience and subjectivity. There is not space here to cover points such as these, but we hope they will form the basis for future work.
Returning to the issue at hand, whilst in his earlier archaeological studies, Foucault has been accused of reducing the subject to a function of discourses that appear to be autonomous (e.g., Dreyfus, 2004; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982), by the time of The Archaeology of Knowledge, there are signs that he was beginning to engage with questions of agency, freedom, and creativity. In considering the implications of his archaeological work, for instance, he posed the challenge to himself:
You make curious use of the freedom that you question in others. For you give yourself the whole field of a free space that you even refuse to qualify. But are you forgetting the care with which you enclosed the discourse of others within systems of rules?... You make revolution very easy for yourself, but very difficult for others. (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 208)
Foucault argues this imagined challenge would be doubly mistaken, both with respect to his definition of discursive practices and the role accorded to human freedom:
These positivities are not so much limitations imposed on the initiative of subjects as the field in which that initiative is articulated… I have not denied &ndash; far from it &ndash; the possibility of changing discourse: I have deprived the sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to it. (p. 209)
Dreyfus (2004) also argues that in the lecture What is an Author? Foucault took another step in elaborating the agency and potential creative powers of subjects through the concept of “founders of discursivity” (such as Freud and Marx) who are able to open up “a new disclosive space” and “a new style of discourse.”
In his discussions of power, Foucault’s work contains clearer indications of the importance of freedom and agency. He stated that, although there was no position of pure autonomy or freedom at the margins of power nor any potential society free of power relations, one is nevertheless not completely “trapped” (Foucault, 1980). Discourses connected to power are “tactically polyvalent” (Foucault, 1976/1981), and can be appropriated strategically in resistance to power. Power relations always contain the possibilities of resistance. Power, for Foucault, is distinguished from forms of domination such as slavery in which there are no grounds for “reciprocal incitation and struggle” (1982). Rather, power is conceived as acting upon the actions of others, of aiming to guide and structure their “possible field of actions” (p. 221). Power is “exercised over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (p. 221). Subjects in power relations are “faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions… may be realized” (p. 221). At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged that power relations are often “fixed in such as way that they are perpetually asymmetrical” (Foucault, 1984/1997a, p. 292), and there is only “extremely limited” margin for action, freedom, or resistance.
However, much of the emphasis in Foucault’s analyses was on ways that people are constituted as subjects by forces beyond their control, and this often seems to leave little room for conceptualising the potential for agency or resistance in his work (McNay, 1994). This leads to possible readings that see Foucault as a “prophet of entrapment” (Simons, 1995) who promotes a negative conceptualisation of power (McNay, 1994) and the “hyper-determination” (Dean, 1994) of the subject, and who is unable to account for the agency and action of subjects that he discussed alongside his analyses of power.
The “Collision” with Subjectivity and the “Critical Ontology of Ourselves”
Foucault (1984/1988) commented near the end of his life that, despite his earlier emphases on the dissolution of the sovereign subject, the problems of the constitution of subjectivity, of how subjects exist, were, after the first volume of The History of Sexuality, “exactly what I collided with” (p. 472).
The “collision” with these problems prompted another shift in his work. As Deleuze (1992) commented, Foucault needed a “new orientation” in order to avoid the implication of the forms of power he was discussing “becoming locked into unbreakable lines of force which would impose definitive contours” (pp. 161) on individual subjects. Deleuze (1986/1988) argued that Foucault faced an impasse that he needed to overcome to maintain the intelligibility of his analyses. This impasse existed “not because of his conception of power but… [concerned] where power itself places us, in both our lives and our thoughts, as we run up against it in our smallest truths” (p. 96).
Foucault’s analytical focus on power was insufficient for adequately framing and addressing issues that arise when considering the potential of the subject to resist, to act in the face of a specific field of possibilities, to, in Heideggerean terms, make a decision as to the way in which it will be. Thus, later in his life Foucault was to concede that his earlier studies focusing on “asylums, prisons and so on… insisted… too much on the question of domination,” (Foucault, 1993, p. 204), and studied only limited aspects of the historical relation of subjects to games of truth (Foucault, 1984/1997a). He recognised that his earlier studies needed to be considered alongside studies of “those forms of understanding which the subject creates about himself [sic]” (Foucault, 1993, p. 203), of “the way in which the subject experiences itself in a truth game in which it has a relation to itself” (Foucault, 1984/1994, p. 316). He needed to undertake a “shift in order to analyse [how]… individuals are given to recognise themselves as… subjects” (Foucault, 1984/1987b, p. 5&ndash;6).
Foucault began to frame his overall project an “analysis of ourselves” based upon a “critical ontology of ourselves” (Foucault, 1984/1997b) as beings historically constituted in relation to specific systems of thought. Foucault identified three domains of this critical ontology: the domain of truth through which we are constituted as objects and subjects of knowledge; that of power in which we are constituted as subjects acting on others and acted upon by others; and that of ethics or “individual conduct” (Foucault, 1984/1988), through which we constitute ourselves as particular types of subjects. Foucault, towards the end of his life, conceptualised his work as concentrating, at different times, on the analysis of each of these domains (Foucault, 1993).
He stated that his analyses could all be seen as examining how we as subjects fit into certain games of truth (Foucault, 1984/1997a), with his earlier work focusing on the first two of these domains, and then finding the need to bring a clearer focus on the third. Foucault was clear that, whilst he maintained his rejection of a priori theories of the constitutive subject, this had never meant “behaving as if the subject did not exist or setting it aside in favour of a pure objectivity” (1984/1994, p. 317).
Foucault’s focus on the third domain of critical ontology entailed examining how “the development of diverse fields of knowledge… the establishment of a set of rules and norms” (1984/1987b, p. 3), with which he had earlier been concerned in their links with power, were linked also to “the way individuals were led to assign meaning and value to their conduct” (p. 4). This entailed a genealogical focus on “the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognises himself [sic] qua subject” (p. 6)—to study the games of truth which surround the relation of self to self and the forming of oneself as a subject.
In all societies, there exist, as well as techniques of power, other techniques, which he called techniques or technologies of the self:
which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves (Foucault, 1993, p. 203).
This is an active process. The subject “constitutes itself in an active fashion” (Foucault, 1984/1997a). However, “these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group” (p. 291).
These technologies of the self coalesce around and take hold of specific thoughts, desires, behaviours, or practices, and are related to imperatives to shape one’s conduct in specific ways. It is here Foucault talked about “government” (e.g., 1982, 1993) in a broad sense to refer to the intersection of strategies by others to govern one’s conduct alongside the actions one performs in relating to and governing oneself.
This is well expressed by Hook (2007). Drawing on Foucault and Rose, he differentiates these technologies of the self from technologies of subjectivity, which refer to broad sets of regulative practices that bring the ambitions and strategies connected to various forms of government of individuals into alignment with individuals’ own ideals. They can be thought of as forms of subjectification that “involve the operation of a type of power that connects the norms of authorities to the motivating ideals we have of ourselves” (Hook, 2007, p. 246).
There is thus a gap between technologies of subjectivity and practices of the self. Foucault’s work implies a degree of freedom in practices of the self, but it must also be noted that they do not entail an “uncomplicated zone of liberation” (Hook, 2007, p. 248)—the project of ethical self-relationship and self-formation becomes thinkable only against the background of the systems of thought and the technologies of subjectivity available within a culture.
Discourse Analysis and the “Critical Ontology of Ourselves”
We now need to consider how our reading of Foucault can “function” for critical psychology and discourse analysis.
Hook (2005a) correctly points out, as we stated, that the conception of discourse and methodological injunctions in Foucault’s methodologically-oriented papers are more easily accommodated within critical genealogies than discourse analysis. The reading of Foucault presented here, however, suggests that the application of “Foucault” to psychology may have wider relevance.
This does not undermine the importance of genealogical studies. Their role in destabilising our illusions of certainty regarding the systems of knowledge that define us is invaluable to any critical project. A case in point is Rose’s (1996) critical history of our modern regimes of the self through which we conceptualise personhood and “psychologised” ways of governing human conduct. However, other forms of analysis may also be suggested by Foucault’s body of work. As Foucault said of Nietzsche, perhaps the best tribute to his work is to use it, “to deform it, to make it groan and protest” (Foucault, 1989, p. 54). If it is then commented that we are being “unfaithful” to the “real” Foucault, “that is of absolutely no interest” (p. 54), as long as the work “functions” in opening up new perspectives.
Rabinow and Rose (2003) similarly argue for a degree of inventiveness in using Foucault’s work. We cannot, they point out, assume that a genealogical “recourse of critical thought to history” can be endlessly repeated “in order to address the issues concerning us today” (p. 9). Foucault's work demonstrated the need to invent methodologies “anew as situations change” (p. 9). It can thus be argued that the
labor that needs to be done to unsettle our conventions must find other forms, other points of action on our present. These might be comparative, conjunctural or ethnographic, or they may take a form that has yet to be invented or named. (p. 9).
The “practice of criticism” we take from Foucault is less a concern for methodology than a “movement of thought” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. 9) and flexible conceptual tools for the analysis of specific problems in specific contexts.
A discourse analysis conceived as a “critical ontology of ourselves” is potentially one such tool (though not the only one possible to conceive). Sufficiently theorised and applied, such a study has some potential strengths. Where genealogy focuses on the historicity and contingent emergence of objects of knowledge and systems of practices, discourse analysis can provide a specific focus on the consequences of power for people who are its subjects, the “cost” of certain forms of truth they are obliged to recognise in themselves (Foucault, 1989), and also their resistances, and their formations of self-relationships. This analysis also allows for a clearer focus on what people themselves struggle with and find “intolerable” (Foucault, 1977). The next question is how we apply Foucault’s work to discourse analysis.
We believe it is important to maintain the overall conception of discourse and the “methodological injunctions” in Foucault’s writings that Hook (2005a) describes: discourse as linked to materiality, the historically-contingent conditions of possibility of systems of knowledge, forms of social practice, and so on. However, as Hook (2005a) notes, these writings provide more a suspicion towards objects of knowledge and our relationships to them than a method understood as steps for analysis. Indeed, Foucault’s analytic approach varied according to the texts he was approaching and the problems he was addressing.
Our analytic approach was developed to study power relationships and forms of subjectivity in community care homes for learning difficulties in the UK through studying individuals’ accounts of their experiences. We discuss our proposed approach in relation to this study, and use appropriate illustrative examples. There is no reason to believe that its relevance will be confined to similar studies, however.
Some moves towards using “Foucauldian” notions of discourse in critical psychology have been made by others, notably Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, and Walkerdine (1998) and Parker (e.g., 1996). These approaches acknowledge that discourses contain subjects, that they make available space for particular practices and types of self, that they support institutions, and reproduce power relations. They aim to arrive at a picture of the versions of the social world existing in a text that comprise specific networks of relationships, and forms of rationality for people implied in them.
However, they do not begin from the same reading of “Foucault” presented here, nor do they operate on individuals’ talk or accounts. Similarly, we are not dealing with the sorts of “prescriptive texts” (those that aim to suggest rules of conduct, that offer opinions and advice on how to behave “as one should,” that allow individuals to question their own conduct, to observe and shape it) that formed the basis of Foucault’s later genealogies.
Our approach contends that much of individuals’ talk (and perhaps especially where they give accounts of their experiences) contains not just reports of their actions and experiences or evidence of the interactional, active use of discourse, but also indications of the systems of knowledge and forms of rationality according to which aspects of their “selves” emerge and are rendered knowable; the formation of a possible field of actions through which their conduct can be guided; the social practices that coalesce around them; the creation of an “identity” that they are led to recognise in themselves; and the emergence of a set of obligations and practices through which they shape their own conduct and relate to themselves in an active fashion. It is also important to consider how people interact with these forces, and how they might experience problems attached to them.
Our study of community care involved discussion with individuals based around the situation of “having learning difficulties,” their relationships both to care homes and to other people within them, their experiences, identities, and the manner in which they conduct themselves. Our analytic approach asks a number of questions of the texts to be analysed, relating to the three domains Foucault outlined for a “critical ontology of ourselves.”
In relation to the domain of truth, we examine something like learning difficulties not as an essential pathology whose nature always resided outside of discourse, awaiting its discovery by medical or psychological knowledge. The diagnosis of someone as “having learning difficulties” is based upon more than the “discovery” of a “condition” within them. It is dynamically connected to the ways in which such “difficulties” emerge in systems of knowledge as a certain type of “problem.”
The aim is thus to draw out how particular aspects of people exist as objects of knowledge in their talk, as things that can be assessed or measured, and about which calculations and judgements can be made. Into which systems of knowledge do they fit, and how can they can be understood and spoken about? We need to highlight instances where aspects of individuals’ physical or psychological characteristics, abilities, thoughts, desires, practices, and so on, are referred to, and examine the types of knowledge that exist of them and the judgements they make available (do people become “abnormal,” “gifted,” “criminal,” “perverse”, etc.).
Secondly, the domain of power encourages us to ask certain questions about care services and environments. Rather than merely offering a set of criteria (such as “normalisation” or “quality of life”) as a yardstick for evaluation, we attend to sets of interventions acting upon people that constitute power—the judgements, decisions, imperatives, prohibitions, and so on which become possible around them, and sets of actions that seek to structure and guide the possible field of their actions (Foucault, 1982).
We must examine, in short, how people are situated in power relationships. This means not questioning simply who “has” power and how they “wield” it in specific situations. Though asymmetries in power relations are important to note, this cannot be the starting point for analysis. Rather, it involves highlighting instances where relationships with others are referenced, and identifying the forms they take, the manner in which one may legitimately govern the conduct of another and the fields of action thus implicated; searching out the implied relative rights to speak or make decisions, examining how certain ways of acting and being acted upon become appropriate in specific contexts; and identifying the possible judgements, decisions, interventions, and so on which exist around the individuals who are referenced.
Thirdly, in relation to ethics or individual conduct, we are led to examine how people relate to various forms of “truth” about themselves. How their talk references obligations for shaping their conduct. How they form relationships to themselves. How they might struggle with or resist forms of power or self-understanding. How they align themselves with or resist attempts by others to govern their conduct.
There must be a wariness here of reinstating conceptions of a priori and essential autonomy (as distinct from agency) and “human nature” struggling against their dialectical opposites of constraining limits. This involves a dual task. On the one hand, attempting to identify the manner in which aspects of people’s lives and identities are constituted as objects of concern for their own behaviour or self-reflection, and the types of action made available for people to act upon their conduct. On the other hand are what we might think of as “Heideggerean-Foucauldian” concerns with subjects-as-agents choosing their “way to be” within the context of the forces, structures, and concepts that position them as certain types of subject and into which they are “always already” “thrown” Primacy should be given to neither of these analytical tasks, but attention paid to their mutual inter-dependence.
We should clarify that we are not proposing an unproblematic convergence of thinking between Foucault and Heidegger. We recognise that accounts of Foucault’s “Heideggereanism” can be over-stated by commentators seeking strong commonalities between them (Sluga, 2004).
It is clear that Foucault and Heidegger began from different positions in their inquiries. Heidegger’s starting point concerned existence and the nature of being. Early on he worked towards a universal theory accounting for the nature of our existence and self-understanding—knowledge of which has become hidden from us and requires a hermeneutic analysis to “do violence” to our practices that participate in “covering up” the nature of our being (see Dreyfus, 1987; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).
Foucault’s starting point was very different, motivated by his earlier-cited attempt to “get out from the question of the subject” by focusing on signifying practices that create people as subjects. There is thus much in (especially early) Heidegger that has no parallel in Foucault—concepts such as the “natural groundlessness” of our actions and our existential anxiety in the face of it, for instance.
However, as Dreyfus (1987) points out (see also Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982), Heidegger later came to reject the belief in an ahistorical nature of being and repudiate the goal of “unmasking” the practices that cover it up. In contrast, he later emphasised the constitution of our understanding of being within a background of cultural practices that make us what we are (Dreyfus, 1987; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).
This seems to be something of a mirror image of the move encountered in later Foucault. Where Heidegger began from the question of the nature of being but was later to rub up against issues of the constitution of our understandings of being in cultural practices, Foucault began by repudiating the phenomenological subject and focusing on the signifying practices that create our understandings of subjectivity but was to run into the earlier-cited “impasse” (Deleuze, 1992) concerning where these questions leave us as agentive subjects.
When we speak, then, of a “more Heideggerean Foucault,” we do not propose simply to reinterpret Foucault as some semi-reconstructed “Heideggerean.” Rather, we believe that our reading of Heidegger’s influence on Foucault and on both Foucault’s and Heidegger’s triangulation on a somewhat similar (but by no means identical) set of problems is useful in focusing the questions outlined within this “third domain” of inquiry—questions of how individuals can be understood both as agentive subjects “choosing their way to be” and as subjectified subjects constituted in their very subjectivity by a set of forces, structures and concepts not of their own making.
We seek here, then, to identify the manner in which people actively relate to themselves as beings with certain identities, and to their environment; the ways they are incited to constitute themselves as beings with certain rights, responsibilities, obligation, needs, and so on; how they act upon themselves and shape their own lives and their own conduct; and the rationalities according to which they do so. This involves highlighting the forms of knowledge, the discourses, which people draw upon in recognising themselves as certain types of being, in referring to themselves as individuals, and through which they recognise ideals by which they direct their own conduct and assign a moral force to their lives and their actions.
There is a fundamental inter-dependence and inter-relation between these three domains. They are not potentially separable analyses, but aspects of this one form of analysis, each of which impacts on the others. Some brief examples from the research study we have discussed will illustrate this. The following extracts are from four (of 22) interviews carried out with people with learning difficulties with recent experience of community care accommodation in England. The interview participant in the first extract had recently moved from a community care home into independent living, and the other three were living in community care homes at the time of interview:
Extract 1
I: Do you remember when you first heard the: um (.) the term learning difficulties? (.) Do you remember when you first heard it? (.) When someone first said=
Wendy: =Well (.) uh (.) wh- I was called mentally handicapped (.) an:d uh I didn’t know what that meant (.) and I asked somebody and it said because you’re thick (1) and it’s not (.) it’s not because you’re thick (.) it’s just because you’ve just got a learning disability (.) I mean I’ve- I’ve had all these tests and they’ve just found out I’ve got dyspraxia (.) which is a word blindness (.) it’s not because I’m thi:ck (.) it’s because I’ve- (.) it’s a bit like dyslexia but it’s not dyslexic (.) it- it affects your co-ordination and (.) whatever
Extract 2
I: Have you noticed anything changing over time (.) you know since you first came in?
Larry: Yeah (1) They seem to treat them properly.
I: Do you think they didn’t treat them properly years ago?
Larry: Mm: (.) no
(2)
I: How do you think things have changed now?
Larry: Well (.) I’m thinking now (1) you see the television now?
I: Yeah?
Larry: Well, you know the lead? They say I’m cutting the leads off (.) and I’m not
I: I see
Larry: It’s always me in here (.) no-one else (.) they know it’s not me doing it.
Extract 3
Paul: I’m having to go to T__ Rd. for a bath.
I: Right just to have a bath? (1)
Paul: Wi- we’re getting it done now but I’ve been still fighting for it innit? It’s not even put in yet
I: Do you have to do a lot of fighting?
Paul: You do yeah (1) You have to fight for what you beli:eve (.)
I: ºRightº
Paul: What you believe is ri:ght but (.) but (.) you’re just a badboy- you’re just a bad boy in’t ya? (.) You’re not- you’re not being quiet (.)
I: Yea:h so you think you’re supposed to be you’re supposed to be a good boy
[and be]
Paul:[You’re] supposed to be a good boy and be quiet ain’t ya?
I: Hhh: (.) so what sor- what sort of things like do ya- I mean what’s being good like?
Paul: Well (.) Ey?
I: I mean uh:
Paul: I know but you- you’re supposed to take what they give ya
I: ºYea:hº
Paul: And say no but (.)
I: Yeah but you=
Paul: =I still don’t do it (.) I won’t do it (.) because I- I believe there should be should be a voice
Extract 4
I: How were the others ((care homes)) different? You prefer it here I gather from what you were saying?
Anne: Well the- uh: the pe:ople (1) I get on with the people here (.) I mean D__ and J__ and I love those people (.) those sort of people […] It’s someone’s birthday this- well like I say someone’s birthday the weekend (.) and I’m- I’m like anyone I feel as though I want to go out and buy: them something but you can’t do: that (.) I did at the time I have- I’ve done it at the time but you can’t do: that it’s not your pla:ce it’s it’s the staff’s place to go out and buy things […] You can do as you like in your own home but you can’t you can’t do as you like in this home (.) so o:((yawns))nly as far as you can go (2.5) so I mean no (.) if you want anything you have to ask for it (1.5) if you want to go out you have to ask to go out […] in these sorts of homes you have to ask permission to do things like this (.) else [it would]
I: 		 	[Does it make=]
Anne: =no: no I no I agree because I like I like to be told (1) I like to be spoke to as if I’m a human being (.) I like to be spoke to as though I can I can uh I can take anything in (.) I take any sort of punishment and any sort of uh (.) anything sort of questions what you give me (.) answers (.) or uh (.) questions or answers or what you give me (.) I can always take it (.) but if I’m in the right I stand up for myself
It should be stated at the outset that we do not intend this section of the paper as a complete analysis that would function as a free-standing piece of research. It is intended only as a means of providing illustrations of the types of readings that might emerge from the analytic stance informed by our readings of Foucault (and Heidegger).
Some discourse analysts might see some cardinal sins here. For instance, our failure to attend to the minutiae of participants’ manner of delivery of their talk or to the interactional nature of what is said might raise objections from psychologists concerned with the occasioned use of talk (e.g., Potter & Hepburn, 2005).
It is possible, for example, to imagine potential analyses of extract 1 that focus on how the interviewer ascribes an identity category to the participant, whose hesitant, pause-littered speech probes for a strategy for managing this ascription. However, whilst we recognise the validity of such perspectives, in this paper we wish to concentrate exclusively on illustrating how the proposed analytic framework might lead to new avenues of exploration for various analyses of discourse. For reasons of brevity and focus, other issues potentially pertinent to producing a more complete piece of analytic research are consciously shelved.
We do not see any reasons that the analytic stance we outline could not function as a part of a study with a broader (or indeed different) overall focus. We do not set up this approach in opposition to any other. Indeed, it is our express intention that the manner in which these proposed philosophical readings and analytical tools are taken up and applied is left an open question.
In the study from which these extracts are taken, for instance, this approach functioned as part of a wider research study that aimed both for a phenomenological sensitivity to participants’ reported experiences (and which shared and discussed emerging analyses at meetings of self-advocacy groups) and also attempted to account for some of the ways that their talk could be understood interactionally in the occasioned context of the interview process (Yates, 2002).
Having thus set out the context and limitations of what will be presented here, we move now to examine briefly some analytical points that we hope will be illustrative.
In the first extract, Wendy references aspects of herself as knowable by particular people and subject to certain judgements. These are concerned specifically with her mental “abilities” or “disabilities” and the significance of becoming known as “mentally handicapped.” Membership of this category is dependent upon observation and assessment by individuals implicitly in a position to know individuals in terms of normality and deviance with respect to mental capacities, and this group is referenced vaguely through the pronoun “they.”
Wendy’s account essentially describes how she is rendered “knowable” by specific forms of observation such that she can be objectified as “handicapped.” It is implicit that people only exist as members of such a category through processes of observation and judgement by relevant others. The account also indicates the different ways that problems can be brought into being and people rendered knowable accordingly. Initially aspects of Wendy’s behaviour and mental “abilities” were “problematised” as “mental handicap.” This problemtisation was linked to a series of judgements about her general mental abilities, such that she was assumed to be “thick,” and about her abilities to live independently, such that she was placed in residential care. Later on, however, her mental abilities were to be re-assessed and problematised in a different way, as a specific learning difficulty—dyspraxia. This different problematisation is linked to different forms of knowledge, such that assumptions of generally impaired mental abilities no longer apply, and to different forms of practice that become appropriate, such that she was no longer deemed in need of being housed in a care home, and was enabled to live independently.
This also begins to indicate that being rendered knowable in relation to discourses of knowledge that problematise aspects of one’s mental abilities is linked to specific practices and particular relationships with others that constitute operations of power. This is more clearly evident in the last three extracts.
All three discuss relationships to institutions and to others within them relating to their position as subjects of care. These relationships imply differing rights to speak, differing prohibitions and imperatives on conduct, and differing ways in which the conduct each can be legitimately acted upon.
Note particularly how Paul and Anne reference these things through the (effectively) general third-person pronoun you (“you have to ask permission,” “you’re supposed to be… quiet”). They are referencing not merely themselves, nor (clearly) anyone in general, but anybody in this particular situation—anyone with learning difficulties living in care. Through this device, they recognise a specific “place”—a specific subject position—connected to (power) relationships with others, and to obligations to manage their conduct in particular ways: “you” have to behave in certain ways and others can direct “your” conduct, “you” have a specific “place” that “you” are obliged to recognise and conduct yourself in line with.
Implicit is a form of subjectification in which “people with learning difficulties” are conceptually divided from others in terms of rights, obligations, prohibitions, imperatives, etc. Within this subjectification is a specific field of possibilities relating to what participants can legitimately do, and what can legitimately be done to them. There are links between the forms of knowledge that objectify particular aspects of “people with learning difficulties,” the formation of subjectivities and relations of power.
There are indications of imperatives and prohibitions in relation to participants’ “place” in their homes and connected to their relationships with staff (“be quiet,” “do not go out without permission,” etc.). Larry’s account, for instance, references judgements about his behaviour made by others. These others, referenced as “they” (“they say I’m cutting the leads off”) and clearly meaning the staff of his home, are in a position to observe Larry’s behaviour and apportion blame for wrongdoings. There is a conceptual division in roles and subject positions in Larry’s account between these others and himself and his co-residents that is accentuated by his presentation of accusations and judgements about his behaviour as recurring and unjustified (“it’s always me in here (.) no-one else”). The relationship presented in Larry’s account between these groups is structured in such as way that on the one hand there are those whose lives are observed and judged; on the other are those who observe, judge and direct their conduct.
The extracts from Anne’s and Paul’s interviews indicate that they are also led to form relationships to themselves in which they manage and govern their conduct in line with ideals relating to their positions as care subjects. As Foucault’s later work predicts, the forms of power that aim to govern their lives exist alongside an incitement to “self-government” in which they relate to themselves in an active fashion. When governed in this sense, people are not forced or coerced. Rather it is a matter of their being led to align their conduct with the ends with which government of their lives is concerned.
Anne and Paul discuss such obligations for governing themselves. Anne comments that although she would like to buy presents for other residents, she recognizes that this is something that someone in her position “cannot possibly do.” Similarly, Paul says that although he speaks his mind, this is something that someone in his situation is not supposed to do, which conflicts with how “you,” as a care subject, are supposed to conduct yourself. Although these accounts mention other people (care staff) in relationships of power with the participants, their accounts imply also the impetus to align themselves with positions through which they can be governed as subjects of care, and actively to govern themselves accordingly.
This must not be confused with determinism. Although these positions are not of their own making, neither are Anne and Paul passive in relation to them. In both accounts, there are two distinct “technologies” of subjectivity: one we have discussed, comprising ideals for governing conduct in line with their position as subjects of care; and another through which they relate to themselves as autonomous, “liberal” subjects with rights, indeed obligations, to “speak their mind” or “stand up” for themselves. Neither of these technologies is of their own making, nor is either a “natural” or “essential” form of self-relationship. It is, though, in relation to both of them that participants form their self-understandings, relate to their own conduct, and conceptualise the relationships and practices in which they are immersed.
Anne and Paul relate to themselves and their environment in very different ways, though drawing upon essentially the same technologies. Anne actively recognises and aligns herself with legitimate obligations to govern her conduct in relation to her “place,” and the activity of speaking her mind or “standing up” for her rights is situated firmly within this self-governance which defines its appropriate limits. Paul’s account, however, sets out a tension between these two positions. He positions being a subject of care and obligations to govern himself as such as being unacceptable, and he draws on the position of being a self-expressing autonomous subject with specific rights to disavow and contest it.
In these accounts (and others from the same study) there is evidence of struggle with the “truth” that defines participants, positions them in institutional and inter-personal relationships and through which they are led to relate to themselves. Identifying points where individuals who are subjects of power struggle with it is important. It relates to questions of critique and the commonly-levelled criticism that Foucault’s work is nihilistic because it lacks any normative basis for evaluating the legitimacy of forms of power, social structures and practices, and leaves no grounds for proposing any reason why domination ought to be resisted (e.g., Haber, 1994; Habermas, 1987).
Indeed, Foucault believed that the existence of a universal morality to which everyone must submit would be “catastrophic” (Foucault, 1984/1988), that there is an indignity in academics presuming to speak for others (Foucault, 1977). There are indications, however, that he was concerned that many power relations become permanently asymmetrical. Foucault was more positive about “agonistic” power relations, denoting “reciprocal incitation and struggle” (1982, p. 222) between power and individual freedom in relations that are flexible enough to allow for creative resistance (see Simons, 1995). These issues are problems “for all those on whom power is exercised to their detriment” (Foucault, 1977, p. 216), for those who find their situation in some way “intolerable.” The problems lie in what people themselves struggle with, and the role of critique becomes not to elucidate the universal principle justifying what people should resist, but to find ways of working with them on their problems. Discursive analyses based on a tripartite Foucauldian “critical ontology of ourselves” can be useful in highlighting these struggles and focusing critique.
Conclusion
We have explored in this paper the impact of a reading of Foucault that conceptualises his shifting analyses in terms of three inter-related domains of a “critical ontology of ourselves”: truth, through which we become constituted as subjects of specific forms of knowledge; power, in which we are constituted as subjects acting upon others and acted upon in particular regulated ways by others; and ethics, in which in which we constitute and relate to ourselves.
This suggests not only genealogies as appropriate applications of Foucauldian scholarship to critical psychology, but also, as Rabinow and Rose (2003) argue for, more inventive, perhaps more ethnographic, forms of analysis. This is not to suggest that such analyses should replace genealogical inquiries. Rather, we envision them existing alongside one another, complementing one another’s strengths. Pace Hook’s (2005a) well-placed warnings about reinstating an inappropriate ahistorical and essential notion of subjectivity, we believe that the importance of theorising the existence of the subject and its self-relationships in Foucault’s work suggests a form of inquiry that nevertheless begins from individuals’ own talk and accounts.
A key strength of genealogies, as Hook (2005a) points out, is in providing an awareness of the historical contingencies of systems of knowledge and practices, and unsettling our illusions of inevitability regarding our present systems of thought and forms of practice. The analysis we have outlined attempts to maintain genealogical suspicion towards objects of knowledge. However, it does lack a historical dimension, and a more thorough historicisation provided by genealogical investigations is undeniably a useful counter-point.
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Transcription Notation
Numbers in parentheses (1) indicate pauses in speech, in seconds.
(.) Indicates a pause of less than one second
A hyphen indicates the breaking off of the preceding sound
Square brackets indicate overlapping speech
A colon (e.g. um:) indicates elongation of the preceding syllable
Underlining indicates stress on specific syllables or words
Degree symbols enclose words noticeably quieter than the surrounding speech
= Indicates the lack of a discernible gap between utterances
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